



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DATE: APR 2004

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
CIS: KAZAKHSTAN CLAIMING LARGER DEFENSE POLICY ROLE

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2. CIS: KAZAKHSTAN CLAIMING LARGER DEFENSE POLICY ROLE

KAZAKHSTAN CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIFIED CIS FORCE, BUT PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV IS PUSHING FOR GREATER INFLUENCE OVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON HIS TERRITORY.

NAZARBAYEV RECENTLY SAID PUBLICLY THAT YEL'TSIN DOES NOT SPEAK FOR KAZAKHSTAN ON DISARMAMENT AND DID NOT CONSULT WITH OTHER CIS LEADERS BEFORE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. HE ALSO SAID HE WILL ARGUE FOR CIS-US STRATEGIC PARITY, WHICH HE CLAIMS US PROPOSALS WOULD UPSET, DURING HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS YEAR.

KAZAKHSTAN'S DEFENSE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCEPTS THE RIGHT OF UKRAINE, BYELARUS, MOLDOVA, AND AZERBAIJAN TO FORM THEIR OWN MILITARIES BUT WILL PUSH AT TODAY'S MEETING OF CIS LEADERS IN MINSK TO KEEP CIS FORCES UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAYS KAZAKHSTAN WANTS GREATER INFLUENCE OVER DECISIONS AFFECTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY. HE SAYS RUSSIA WILL COORDINATE DECISIONMAKING WITH ALMA-ATA ON APPOINTMENTS OF KEY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND REDEPLOYMENT OF ANY FORCES ON KAZAKH TERRITORY. IT ALSO HAS RECENTLY SOUGHT SOME CONTROL OVER AND ECONOMIC BENEFIT FROM ACTIVITIES AT THE TYURATAM MISSILE TEST RANGE; SO FAR, IT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE SARYSHAGAN TEST FACILITY. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: NAZARBAYEV, WHO WAS NAMED IN A POLL AS THE OFFICER CORPS' FAVORITE POLITICAL LEADER, APPEARS TO BE PLAYING A COMPLEX POLITICAL GAME INTENDED TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KAZAKHSTAN. HE IS TRYING TO INCREASE HIS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STATURE, TO RETAIN MILITARY SUPPORT BY ESPOUSING THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARITY, AND TO GAIN MORE CONTROL OVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, HOWEVER, HE SUPPORTS CONTINUED RUSSIAN PRIMACY IN MILITARY MATTERS TO ENSURE RUSSIAN FINANCING OF MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET. THESE PARTIALLY CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES GIVE HIM LESS LEVERAGE THAN HE WOULD LIKE TO PROJECT. NAZARBAYEV REPORTEDLY HAS AGREED TO THE REMOVAL OF ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM KAZAKHSTAN WITHIN SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE START TREATY DRAWDOWN BEGINS PROBABLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES KAZAKHSTAN'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE DEPENDS ON ITS COOPERATIVENESS. IN ANY CASE, THERE IS NO REALISTIC PROSPECT THAT THE KAZAKHS WILL CONTROL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. [REDACTED]

ALMA-ATA PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE ITS COOPERATIVENESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON MILITARY FORCES BECAUSE OF ITS VULNERABILITY TO CHINA, LATENT TENSION WITH UZBEKISTAN, AND CONCERNS ABOUT ETHNIC UNREST IN ITS SLAVIC-DOMINATED NORTHERN REGION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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


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